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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CO}IBIXED ~IETALS REDUC-
TION COMPANY, a corporation, 
and 
BUD T. STEVEN.SON AND JOHN 
E. ALVERSON, co-partners doing 
business under the firm name and 
style of Stevenson & Alverson, No. 6319 
Plaintiffs, 
'VS. 




This is an original proceeding to review a decision 
of the Industrial Commission of Utah holding that the 
plaintiffs, Bud T. Stevenson and John E. Alvers-on, and 
all men employed by them, were employees of the plain-
tiff, Combined Metals Reduction Company, and affirm .. 
ing a decision of the Appeals Examiner of the Unem-
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ployment Compensation Division of the Industrial Com-
mission, which ·affirmed two representative decisions 
holding that the employer-employee relationship existed 
between the parties, ~and denied the petitions of both 
pa~ties th.a t the relationship be held to be one of land-
lord and tenant under a lease agreement. 
There are no disputed facts; th·e record consists of 
petition (Record pp. 7) by Stevenson and Alverson to 
the Commission for adjudication of status, in which is 
set out in full their previous letter to the Commission 
(which remained unanswered) and in which is set out 
also the lease agreement between them and Combined 
Metals Reduction Company; the two representative de-
cisions (Record pp. 1-3) the. one denying the prayer of 
the petition and holding Stevenson and Alverson and all 
their employees to be employees of Combined Metals 
Reduction Company, the other being a holding and no-
tice to the same effect purporting to require Combined 
Metals Reduction Company to submit supplemental wage 
information and to include therein the earnings of s-aid 
Stevenson and Alverson and their employee~, and to pay 
contributions or tax accordingly; separate notices of 
app·eal by both parties to the Appeals Tribunal (Record 
pp. 4-5) ; Transcript of evidence introduced before that 
Tribunal, supplemented by Exhibit No. 1, the petition 
of Stevenson and .Alverson, Exhibit No. 2, General 
Safety Orders covering underground metal mining oper-
ations, issued by the Industrial Commission of Utah, Ex-
hibit No. 3, Handbook description of leasing system in 
gener·al, Exhibit No.4, Statement by Col. Fleming, Wage 
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and Hours Adn1inistrator relating to "hot ore" p·ro-
duced in leasing operations, etc., and Exhibit No. 5, 
sample settlement sheets; decision by the Appeals Ref-
eree (Record pp. 12-16) ; notice of appeal to the Indus-
trial Commission (Record pp. 18-19) ; notice to the par-
ties of affirmation of the decision by the Commission 
(Record pp. 23) ; petition by both parties to this Court 
for Writ of Review (Record pp. 29-31); and Writ of Re-
view (Record pp. 32-33). 
Combined Metals Reduction Company will herein-
after be referred to as ''lessor'' and Stevenson and Al-
verson as ''lessees''. 
Since the record is not voluminous, and there is no 
dispute about the facts, only a brief statement of the 
facts will be necessary at this time. 
Stevenson and Alverson formed a partnership to 
engage in business for themselves, and on Jun·e 9, 1938, 
entered into a lease agreement with ~combined Metals 
Reduction Company; they did about six months' devel-
opment, or dead work, during which time the Comp-any 
loaned them money; in December, 1938, they struck ore, 
and in January, 1939, they hired several men to take 
out the deposit they had found; they applied for and 
received employer's numbers with the Utah State Unem-
ployment Division and the F'ederal s.ocial Security Di-
vision, and during the year paid contributions or tax on 
a payroll in excess of $8;600.00 ; they paid back to the 
lessor all moneys loaned; kept their own books of ac-
count; paid their exp·enses, and bought machinery and 
equipment to carry on their operations; they hired and 
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fired men at their own discretion and without consult-
ing Company officials, and they were not supervised or 
directed by Company officials in any \\Tay in carrying 
on their operations. 
The decision, rested in entirety upon construction 
of the lease agreement, briefly stated, holds-
( a) That the contract required a personal 
service of the lessees. This is bottomed on the 
following expression in the lease-'' The lessee 
agrees . . . to personally supervise the work and 
assist in the performance thereof ... '' 
(b) The provisions of Sec. 19 ( j) (5) (a) 
have not been complied with in that "direction 
and control (were) reserved by the Company in 
the contract''. 
(c) That the s·ervices were not performed 
outside of all the places of business of the Com-
pany. 
(d) That the lessees were not customarily 
engaged in an independently established trade, 
occupation, profession or business. 
The petition for Writ of Review raises the following 
questions, as therein stated: 
(a) That the conclusion reached that Stev-
enson and Alverson are not employers but are 
performing services in employment for ·Combined 
Metals Reduction Company is not supported by 
the facts and is contrary to law. 
(b) A judicial question is involved, the de-
termination of which is outside and beyond the 
jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission of 
Utah. 
(c) That Sec. 19 (j) Utah Unemployment 
Compensation Law ('Ch 1 Special Session 1936, 
Amd Ch 43, 1937 and Ch 52, 1939) is invalid 
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under Sec. 23, .L\rt. VI, Constitution of Utah, as 
to title of amendatory acts. 
(d) Also that said Utah Unemployment 
Compensation Law is violative of Federal and 
State Constitutions, as unreasonably depriving 
parties of the right to contract. 
All of these prop.ositions will be relied upon by 
lessor ; only (a) and (d) by the lessees. 
What we present here is not to be taken as criticism 
of the Industrial Commission or any of its personnel; 
our contacts with them indicate they are anxious to ar-
rive at a correct solution of the perplexing situation 
now confronting mine operators and those individuals 
who desire to be something more than wage earners 
and who have the initiative to try to establish themselves 
in business. And this case is brought here, and is to 
be considered by the Court, as much in the interest of 
the latter as the former class. Rightly understood mine 
leasing is a co-operative effort between the owner and 
the lessee to bring about the production of met~als that 
cannot otherwise be produced, and for their mutual 
profit and advantage. So understood, the interests of 
one are the interests of the other. 
The aims and purposes of the Utah Unemployment 
Compensation Act, The Federal Social Security Acts, 
and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 were ben·e-
ficent. 
When the application of those acts to an industrial 
activity results in stopping that activity, and in putting 
on to relief rolls something like 1200 families in this 
state who had theretofore been sup·ported by honest 
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labor in a gainful occupation, the beneficent purposes 
seem to have been thwarted; and that suggests an inquiry 
whether such application is necessary under the laws. 
''Leasing Operations'' have played a very im-
portant role in the development of our mineral re-
sources ; many larg,e and responsible mining operations 
of today began under leases embodying the same ele-
ments as are involved in the lease under consideration 
in the case at bar. 
Since the decision by this. court in the National 
Tunnel and Mines Company case the Department of 
Placement and Unemployment Insurance of the Indus-
trial Commission has held that the rules there laid down 
must be applied to all mining leases, and that the lessees 
must be held to be employees of the lessor; and the 
reason for discussing in this connection the Federal So-
cial Security act and rulings and the Wage and Hour 
('Fair Labor Standards Act) and the rulings is that 
those rulings seem to stem from or justify under the 
mentioned decision. True the application has been re-
laxed somewhat to permit exemption of so-called '' iso-
lated leases" as distinguished from "block leases". 
Perhaps the statement made by the Wage and Hour 
Administrator in his speech at Salt Lake City, October 
30, 1940, best shows what is meant by this. 
Colonel Fleming said: 
"Perhaps we have received more inquiries 
relative to the status of lessees in metal mining 
than about any other one thing. Obviously we 
cannot do what some have hoped we would do, 
\Vhich is to say in advance that we '\\rill recognize 
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certain types of leases as valid, in the sense that 
" ... e will consider those who hold them to be in-
dependent operators as to whose wages and 
working hours the lessor has no legal respon-
sibility. In July, I announced a determination, 
made at the request of metal mine operators in 
these intermountain States, in which I said about 
all it is possible for me to say on the subject. I 
may as well repeat it. I stated that each case 
must be determined on its- particular facts, with 
primary importance given to the terms of each 
individual lease agreement and the method of 
operation under such agreement. If under the 
lease agreement control and .supervision over 
the operations of the so-called lessee are reserved 
to the lessor, such lease agreement embodies the 
normal incidents of the employer-employee rela-
tionship and the so-called lessees will he con-
·sidered as employees under the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act. 
"On the other hand, if a particular lessee is 
operating property which is not a part of the 
property currently being op-erated by the mining 
company with regular employees, and if in the 
lease agreement the mining company does not 
have the right to control the lessee in his opera-
tion of the mining property, it may well he that 
the lessee is not an employee of the mine owner 
but is in fact an independent operator of such 
property .... (italics supplied) 
"Two courts recently have held lessees of 
mining property to be employees of the mine 
owner. One of the cases was decided by the 
Supreme Court of your own State under the 
Utah Unemployment Compensation Act. Proba-
bly you are familiar with the case which is desig-
nated as 'National Tunnel and Mines Company 
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v. Industrial 'Commission of Utah.' The other 
decision was under the Fair L·abor Standards 
Act and \\ras rendered by a Federal Judge in 
Oregon as a result of the proceedings instituted 
by the Division against the Cornucopia Mining 
Company. In both eases the mining company 
exercised complete control over the operations 
performed by the lessees .... '' 
The administrative agencies unde~ these acts seem 
to be in agreement that the foregoing statement is cor-
rect. Summarizing the situation seems to he that: 
(a) Where the lease agreement reserves 
control and supervision of operations to the 
lessor; 
(b) Where, regardless of the lease agree-
ment, the lessor exercises .control and supervi-
sion; 
(c) Where, regardless of (a) or (b) it is a 
so-called "block-lease",-i.e. ''is * * a part of the 
property currently being operated by the min-
ing company"',-
then the relationship of employer-employee exists, and 
compliance with the acts is necessary. The application 
of ·those rules stops about 90% of mine lease operations. 
We do not, of course, suggest that responsibility for the 
cessation of leasing operations rests upon this court, 
or upon ·our Industrial Commission, or even upon our 
Legislature. The Acts in their operation and effect 
dove-tail and the rulings under one act are persuasive 
as to ·the others. 
It is believed that the record in this case presents 
so different a picture of mine leasing and practice than 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the one the Court heretofore considered that the Court 
Inay feel constrained to n1odify the rules already laid 
do'vn or to distinguish this case. 
1. WH_A_T _..\_~fiNING LEASE IS. 
A mining lease, in its elements and consequences, 
is no different than any other lease. Under it the rela-
tionship of landlord and tenant is established, an estate 
in the demised premises is conveyed to the lessee, he 
is entitled to exercise dominion, for the time being, over 
the premises, and to maintain action against anyone, 
even the owner, who attempts to interfere with his pos-
session. These are so elemental we think they need no 
elaboration. 
In the record (pp. 9) is to he found a general state-
ment as to leasing operations and how they have hee~1 
regarded by mining men for a long period of time. 
The best treatment of mining leases from the legal 
s-tandpoint that we have found is in Snyder on Mines, 
Vol. 2, Section 1141, p. 932, to Section 1165, p. 9'53. 
In Couch v. Welch (Utah, Nov. 13, 1901), 24 Utah 36, 
66 Pac. 600, the Court says: 
'' ... The contract contains essential char-
acteristics of a lease. On its face it appears that 
the lessors were 'desirous of leasing' as well as 
selling the property. In the agreement they 
'grant, lease and demise' 'the mining claims, fix 
the terms of the lease, and provide for work to 
be performed, which is to be 'not less than ninety 
shifts' each month 'during the term of the lease'. 
Rent is reserved by way of royalty, and its man-
ner of payment stipulated. Forfeiture and sur-
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render of possession are provided for in the 
event of a failure on the part of the lessees to 
perform any of the covenants of the lease to be 
performed by them. These are elements of a 
lease. In fact an examination of the instrument 
shows that the evident design of the lessors 
was to lease the mining claims and grant to the 
lessee the privilege to purchase them, and the 
mere fact that the agreement also contains a 
covenant granting the 'privilege of purchasing' 
the demised premises does not destroy its char-
.acter as a lease. Nor is· such a covenant inimical 
to the existence of the relation of landlord and 
tenant betw·een the p·arties prior to the exercise 
of the privilege. 
18 AM & ENG Enc Law (2nd Ed.) 169; Clif-
ford v. Gressinger, 96 Ga. 789, 2·2 SE 399; 
Nobles v. McCarty, 61 Miss 456; Hartwell 
v. Black, 48 Ill. 301; Barrett v. J ohns·on, 
2 Ind. App. 25, 27 NE 983; Crinkley v. 
Egerton, 113 NC 444, 18 SE 669; Holbrook 
v. Chamberlain, 116 Mass. 155, 77 Am. 
Rep. 146. 
Nor does the fact that the contract provides for 
the payment of royalty, instead of rent in money, 
change the character of the instrument, or pre-
vent the creation of the relation of landlord and 
tenant. Rent may be n1ade payable otherwise 
than in money, 2 Bl. ~comm. 41. 
''We are of the opinion that the contract in 
this case must he regarded as a lease, and that 
the relation of landlord and tenant existed be-
tween the parties to this controversy .... '' 
That case seems not to have been overruled, or the 
doctrine of it departed from. And so far as we have 
been able to discover there is no ease holding that a 
10 
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lease does not create the relation of landlord and tenant, 
unless it be the one cited in Lindley on Mines, Sec. 861, 
p. 2133, 'Yhere the author says: (@ p·. 2139) 
''It has been held in California that a con-
tract giving the right to work a mine for a cer-
tain time, the gross product to be equally divided 
between the parties, is not a lease ; that such a 
contract does not create the relation of landlord 
and tenant, but fixes a rule of compensation for 
services rendered, and is in all its essential fea-
tures a contract for labor to be performed and 
to be paid for by a share of the profits." (78) 
Hudepohl v. Liberty Hill Cons. M. & W. Co. 
80 Cal. 553, 22 Pac. 339; Stuart v. Adams, 
89 Cal. 367, 26 Pac. 960. 
And of the Hudepohl case, Judge Snyder says: Vol. 
2, p. 945-
, 'But the California court, in order to up-
hold the contract and evade the shoals presented 
by the statute of that state, held that where a 
corporation agreed to lease to plaintiff for one 
year the right to work and mine certain mining 
ground, the gross product thereof t.o be divided 
between plaintiff and defendant, it was not a 
lease, but an agreement to work a mine. This 
California case, however, is like some other 
decisions from that state, one resulting from ex-
pediency merely, and not from the apparent law 
of the case. '' 
And in a later case the California court pointed 
to the distinction between that case and a lease case, 
Conner v. Garrett (Cal. 2-21-1924), 224 Pac. 786, @ p. 
787-
"(2) Appellant contends that the instru-
ment referred to herein as a lease was not such 
11 
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in fact but ":as 'a mere license to 'vork the min-
ing property on a royalty basis.' The char-
acter of the instrument, for the purposes of 
this case, seems to be unimportant .. If it be 
called a lease, as in Northern Light Min. Co. 
v. Blue Goose Min. Co., 25 Cal. App. 282, 143 
Pac. 540, a license, as in Wheeler v. W·est, 71 
Cal. 126, 11 Pac., 871; or a contract of employ-
rnent as in Hudepohl v. Mining & Water Co., 
80 Cal. 553, 22 Pac. 339, the .result is the same." 
We think, on the authority of the Utah case, cit. 
sup, and general authority on the subject, the lease 
here in question must be held to be a bona fide lease 
transaction. 
If this is the case, is there anything implicit in 
the document that justified the decision that it calls 
for personal service for wages, and thus changes its 
character~ The decision on that point is rested on 
the sole recital,-'' The lessee agrees . . . . to person-
ally supervise the work and assist in the performance 
thereof ... '' 
That mining is a hazardous occupation justifying 
elaborate police regulation, will not be disputed. But 
it is surprising t.o learn that an owner who leases his 
property and in the lease agreement provides for re-
sponsibility to attend the leasing operation, should 
thereby change the entire character of the transaction. 
We should think, rather, that the policy of the law 
would be to encourage all owners of mining property 
to see to it that only careful, competent and respon-
sible men be permitted to lease their property. More-
over, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 19·38, requires 
12 
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that owners of mines who ship in interstate commerce 
see to it that n·o '·'hot ore'' is included in their ship-
ments; violation of the act in this resp·ect might suhjoot 
the o'vner to a fine of $10,000.00 for a first offense, and 
might result in an order restraining all his shipment 
in interstate commerce. 
"Hot ore" would be that produced where e. g. 
minors were employed, where minimum wages were not 
paid, or where men worked more than the hours speci. 
fied in the act without payment of time: and a. half for 
the overtime. The Utah law defines a shift in a mine 
as eight hours, collar to collar, and prohibits the em-
ployment of minors. The Industrial Commission rules 
and regulations provide elaborate police regulation for 
all mining operations. The owner of a mine, and the 
public are vitally interested, and surely there can be nc 
impropriety in requiring that lessees ''personally su-
pervise the work and assist in performance thereof.'' 
We think a reasonable construction of this con-
tract will result in a holding that it creates a non-ser-
vice relationship and that there is no occasion to con-
sider the -a, b, and c, tests. 
II. THE COMMISSION'S DE·CISION. 
Two men formed a partnership and entered into a 
written lea~e with a corporation, the owner of certajn 
mining ground, by ·the terms of which they leased for 
a period of three months a certain designated p·ortion 
or block ·of such mining ground. 
The Company did not know when they entered or 
13 
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left the ground or who or how many men they had 
working for them, except as they monthly furnished 
to the Company for purposes of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act a list of the men they had employed and 
the time each had worked. 
While the lease provided that they should not take 
into the property anyone objectionable to the Company 
this provision was in practice entirely disregarded and 
the Company never knew in advance who was employed 
by the lessees. 
Before entering into this lease one of the partners 
had done some leasing,- both were experienced miners. 
For some time after the lease was entered into 
they trammed their ore and waste to the surface except 
where waste could be disposed of underground. Later 
the Company installed an electric locomotive and 
tramn1ed waste without charge to the lessees and ore 
at a charge of about fifteen cents a ton less than it had 
' cost the lessees to tram their own ore. The lessees 
were not required to make use of this service but did 
use it because of the saving it meant to them. 
There ~ras no supervision or direction of the work 
of the lessees vvhatever. The only time representatives 
of the Company ever entered the leased block of ground 
was for purposes of acquiring geological data and to 
determine that the lessees were working in the leased 
ground and had not gone beyond its limits. 
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For some six months after obtaining the first 
lease the partners did development or dead work and 
then they struck ore and hired several men to take 
out the deposit they had found. During the year 19·39 
their payroll-".,.ages paid to men employed by them-
exceeded $8,600.00. During the course of their work 
they have accumulated and now own a substantial 
amount of mining equipment and a motor truck. 
The Industrial Commission has determined that 
these two men so far from being engaged in business 
on their own account, as they, with some seeming jus-
tice believed themselves to be, were, at least for the 
purposes of the Utah Unemployment Compensation 
Act, employees of the corporation from whom they 
leased the mining ground which after six months de-
velopment produced ore in such amounts as to occa-
sion the expenditure of thousands of dollars in wages 
to men whom they employed. 
How did the Industrial Commission arrive at this 
extraordinary conclusion~ 
The Industrial Commission merely affirmed the 
decision of its Appeals Referee and the answer is to 
be found in a paragraph headed "Comments"· appear-
ing at the top of page 4 of the Opinion of such Referee. 
This paragraph reads as follows: 
"The statutory definition of 'employment' 
contained in the Utah Unemployment Compen-
sation Law, quoted at the beginning of this 
decision, requires that we first determine whe-
ther or not a service was performed for a wage 
or under any contract of hire, written or oral, 
15 
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express or implied. In other decisions I have 
interpreted the term 'service' to imply a per-
sonal service. In paragraph one of the con-
tract under consideration, the Company obvious-
ly required a personal service of Stevenson and 
Alverson. This paragraph reads in part as fol-
lows; 'The lessee agrees ... to personally super-
vise the work and assist in the performance 
thereof ... ' The remuneration of the nature 
received by the lessees has been held by our 
Supreme Court to constitute wages. See NA-
TIONAL TUNNEL AND MINES CO'MPANY v. 
INDUSTRIAL COM·MISSIO·N OF UTAH, 102 P. 
2d 508. Our proper conclusion, therefore, is to 
the effect that the lessees did perform a service 
for a wage and, therefore, the (a), (b), and (c) 
provisions of Section 19 (j) ( 5) will be applied 
to the relationship to determine whether or not 
it was one which constituted 'employment' sub-
ject to the provisions of the Utah Unemployment 
Compensation Law.'' 
The Referee determined that the lessees performed 
a personal service because, 
' ' The lessee agrees . . . to personally super-
vise the work and assist in the performance 
thereof ... '' 
But the Referee did not stop to inquire 'vhether this 
personal service was performed by the lessees for their 
own account ·or for the account of someone else. On 
the contrary, the Referee assumed that since personal 
service was performed by the lessees it must have 
been performed for the Company from whom they 
leased the mining ground! 
16 
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''-rhy did the Referee make this assumption 1 Ap-
pa.rently because this Honorable Court in the cited 
case had held that "remuneration of the nature re-
ceived by the lessees ... constitute wages". 
This is indeed reasoning in a circle. Before any 
question of the receipt of wages is involved and inde-
pendently thereof, it must be determined whether· ser-
vices are performed '' f.or another''. The form in 
which remuneration is received is not determinative of 
whether services are being so rendered : ''Wages"' are 
defined in the Utah Unemployment Compensation Act 
as all compensation payable for personal services ren-
dered for another under a contract of hire, express 
or implied. Any remuneration therefore, whatever its 
form, may constitute wages if it is received for personal 
services rendered for another. But remuneration, no 
matter what its form, does not constitute wages if 
received for personal service rendered for one's own 
account and not for another. This obvious and funda-
mental fact the Appeals Referee entirely overlooked. 
The point was clearly made by this Honorable 
Court in its opinion in The Fuller Brush Company v. 
Industrial Commission, 104 P. (2d) 201, at 204, where 
this Court said: 
"That claimant performed personal service 
is not in dispute, but there is a dispute as to 
whether such services were performed for plain-
tiff or for self, and as to whether he received 
wages therefor or profits on sales. In other 
w·ords, was the relationship between plaintiff 
and claimant that of employer and employef\ or 
17 
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that of vendor and vendee~ The finding being 
positive and definite that claimant in the per-
formance of the personal service was free of all 
direction and control by plaintiff, both in fact 
and under his con tract of hire, it must follow of 
necessity that he did not perform service for 
plaintiff under a contract of hire or for wages, 
and therefore the relationship was one that never 
came within the scope of the act because he v:as 
not in employment that would bring him within 
the act, to wit, rendering personal services for 
another under a contract of hire or for wages, 
Since there was no obligation on plaintiff to pay 
claimant any remuneration for services, but 
claimant must get his remuneration, if any, from 
his ability to sell the brushes at an advanced 
price over the cost to him and that he and not 
plaintiff assumed the risk of profit or loss on the 
venture or undertaking, it follows claimant's 
services were not rendered for wages or under 
a contract of hire. The error came a b o u t 
through a misinterpretation of the law, in hold-
ing that all personal services were within the_ act 
unless excluded by the provisions of Sec. 19 (j) 
( 5), -whereas only those personal services are 
within the act which are rendered for another 
for wages or under a contract of hire. As 
pointed ·out above, Sec. 19 (j) (5) is an exception 
provision, applying only after it has been deter-
mined that personal services were rendered for 
another for wages or under a contract of hire. 
It excepts from this class certain instances in 
which the three conditions of that section all 
are present. 
''Since claimant never came within the act 
as rendering personal service for another for 
wages ·Or under a contract of hire, it is unneces-
18 
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s-ary to consider '""hether he was customarily 
engaged in an independently established busi-
ness.'' 
Here, as in The Fuller Brush case, he who runs 
may see that the relationship bet,Yeen the parties was 
not that of employer and employee but that of lessor 
and lessee ; that the lessees assumed the risk of profit 
or loss on the undertaking; th·at there was no obliga-
tion on the lessor to pay the lessees any remuneration 
for the services they rendered; that such services were 
rendered by them for their own account and not for 
the account of the lessor and therefore the remunera-
tion which they received as a result of their success in 
the mining operations conducted by them did not con-
stitute wages, but profits. 
There is no occasion to go further ; no occasion 
to inquire as to whether, had the lessees been employees 
of the lessor, they would have come within the provi-
sions of the Utah Unemployment Compensation Law; 
to inquire as to the applicability of Section 19 (j) ( 5) 
since as this Honorable C·ourt has pointed out, that 
section becomes material only after it has been deter-
mined that personal services were rendered for another 
for wages or under a contract of hi~re. 
We shall, however, comment briefly upon the re-
maining section of the Appeals Referee's Opinion be-
cause in requesting a reconsideration by this Honorable 
Court of the status of mine lessees, it seems desirable 
to call attention to the processes of reasoning by which 
the Administrative Agency supervising the Utah Un-
19 
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employment Compensation Law utilizes Section 19 (j) 
(5) as a sort of magic wand to bring every claimant 
within the coverage of that law : 
Having determined that two men who took a lease, 
risked months of their time, finally struck ore, employed 
other men, paid large wages and made a profit were 
all the time employees of the company from which 
they leased, the Appeals Referee is then concerned 
with whether or not the "services" rendered by these 
men for the lessor were (a) performed subject to the 
lessor's direction and control, (b) performed outside of 
all place's of business of the lessor, and (c) whether the 
lessees 'vere customarily engaged in an independently 
established trade, occupation, profession or business. 
The Appeals Referee determined that the ''ser-
vices performed for the company'' were performed sub-
ject to its direction or control. This the Appeals Ref-
eree did notwithstanding the uncontradicted testimony 
that there was no direction or control of the work of 
the lessees. The Appeals Referee arrived at this con-
clusion in this way: He said: 
''The provisions of the contract indicate 
that the Company did reserve a right of direc-
tion and control * * * ''. '' The agreement is one 
of short duration and also provides for its ter-
nlination by the Company upon thirty days' 
notice. The Company could, if it desired, compel 
the lessees to conduct their mining activities in 
any manner pleasing to it!" '·'The contract pro-
vides that the work is to be performed in a 
'good and miner-like fashion', and implies that 
the Company could determine, if it so desired~ 
20 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
what 'vould constitute a compliance with this 
provision!'' 
Did anyone ever hear of a mining lease, whether 
of a block of ground or a whole mining property, which 
did not require that ""'"ork be done ''in a good and miner-
like fashion" 1 Did anyone ever assume that a require-
ment that a certain standard be maintained constituted 
a right to direct the manner in which the work should 
be done, the results of which would meet such standard Y 
Did anyone ever assume in the face of the admitted fact 
that a lease had been renewed time after time and no 
control had been exercised, that control was reserved 
because the lease could be terminated on a short notice 7 
The Appeals Referee then inquires as to whether 
the work was performed outside of all places of business 
of the company and concludes that it was not because : 
''The rights of possession granted to the 
lessees by the terms of the contract are so limited 
that I am forced to say that the place at which 
the service was performed by the lessees was a 
place of business of the Company • * • * '' 
The lease is in evidence and we respectfully submit that 
whatever the .Appeals Referee may have been "forced" 
to say, no lawyer would feel ''forced'' or even excused 
for saying that the property covered by such lease re-
mained a place of business of the lessor notwithstanding 
the giving of the lease. 
If the contract here is a bona fide lease it conveys_ 
an estate· in the property to the lessee and he there-
after has dominion over it. To say, that the lessor can 
thereafter currently carry on operations in that prop.erty 
21 
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with its own employees, seems to involve a plain con-
tradiction in terms ; and that is true whether the lease be 
considered an "isolated" ·one or a so-called "block"' 
lease. The lessee is operating, for the time being, in 
his own property, and it cannot be any part of the place 
of business of lessor mining company. 
F'inally the Appeals Referee, having satisfied him-
self that the operations of the lessees in fact constituted 
mere employment, that the ''services'' rendered by them 
were subject to direction and control of the lessor, and 
that the leased ground remained a place of business of 
the lessor, says that it would be superflous to enter into 
a lengthy discussion of the last provision of Section 19 
(j) ( 5)' namely as to whether the lessees were custo-
marily engaged in an independently established trade, 
occupation, profession or business. He therefore merely 
makes the statement that they in fact were not so en-
gaged! 
The record shows that these lessees formed a part-
nership on June 9, 1938 and entered into a lease with the 
lessor; six months later they discovered ore. Through-
on~ the year 1939 and the year 1940, up at· least until 
the date of the hHaring in October, of that year, they 
were engaged in operating leased property. Before the 
first of these leases were taken one of the partners had 
done leasing. How long must a man be engaged in some 
line of work · before he is ''customarily'' engaged in 
such line of work~ Does it matter that prior to two 
and one-half years before the hearing one of these 
lessees had already been engaged in leasing while the 
22 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
other one had not J? Certainly it would be strange if, 
because of "~hat a man had done s·ome years in the 
past, his present status should be held to be different 
from that of another man presently engaged with the 
first in an identical occupation. Certainly it would be 
contrary to common sense and reason to hold that two 
men \Yho had oYer more than tvYO years time engaged in 
a successful business operation on their own account, 
in the course of 'vhich they had employed many men 
and paid out thousands of dollars in wages, had 
accumulated a substantial amount of equipment, earned 
and divided profits, were not customarily engaged in 
an independently established occupation. We wonder 
whether the Appeals Referee would hold that a man 
elected for the first time to ·a public office was, during 
the first term, customarily engaged in performing the 
duties of such office or whether it would be necessary 
for such man to be re-elected for a second or perhaps 
·a third term before the Appeals Referee could feel that 
he was customarily so engaged' 
III. WHAT JURI~SDICTION, IF ANY, DOES THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSON HAVE OF . THE 
QUESTION AS TO LIABILITY F·OR CONTRI-
BUTT·ONS BY ONE WHO CLAIMS NOT TO BE 
WITHIN THE ACT~ 
On the authority of Fuller Brush Company v. In-
dustrial Commission, 104 Pac. (2d) 201, we would say 
that the repre~entative order (Record p. 3) requiring 
Combined Metals Reduction Company to pay ~nto the 
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Unemployment Compensation Fund the necessary con-
tributions on wages earned by Stevenson and Alverson, 
and their employees, is without validity. 
If that means without validity for any purpose, 
the question seems to he settled. But construed in 
the light of previous expressions of members of the 
court, it may only mean tha:t ·although the order is 
without validity to compel payment at this time, it may 
nevertheless be regarded as res judicata in a subsequent 
proceeding by the State Tax Commission to collect the 
contribution. And the Commission, as we understand, 
takes the position that this is so, and that in a proceed-
ing by the Tax Commission based upon a previous order 
and demand by the Industrial Commission, the only 
question involved would be whether either commission 
had acted arbitrarily and capriciously. It is important 
that we know when we must make a defense on the 
merits if we claim to have one. 
one. 
The ques·tion is a judicial, not an administrative 
Industrial Commission v. Evans, 52 Utah 394, 
174 Pac. 825. 
And the rule there laid down has not been departed 
from. MT. Justice Wolfe, in dissenting opinion, ~ogan 
Cache Knitting Mills v. The Industrial Commission, 102 
Pac. (2d) 495, said: 
''In the following cases it was held that 
questions on relationship of employer-employee, 
number of employees, etc., are 'jurisdictional 
faets' on which the appell·ate court will 'review 
and weigh the evidence certified -in the record' 
24 
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to determine whether Commission had jurisdic-
tion. (Cases cited.) In these cases the Court 
considered the evidence ane'v and determined 
what conclusion should have been reached on 
those facts and, on the basis of its conclusion, 
affirn1ed or reversed. 
''The Utah cases are to this effect: Ind. 
Com. v. Evans, 52 Utah, 394, 174 Pac. 825; Hard-
man v. Ind. Com., 60 Utah 203, 207 Pac. 460; 
Angel v. Ind. Com., 64 Utah, 105, 228 Pac., 509; 
Norris v. Ind. Com., 90 Utah, 25,6, 61 Pac. (2nd) 
413; Holt v. Ind. Com., 96 Utah 484, 87 Pac. 
(2nd) 686. " 
And the following excerpt is taken from Roberts v. 
Industrial Commission (Utah, Aug. 15, 1939), 93 Pac. 
(2d) 494 @ 495: 
'·' * * * Each record of trial under this law 
should be comp!ete in and of itself. Each ele-
ment necessary to sustain an order by the tribunal 
or commission, under this law, should be sup-
ported by testimony, exhibits, or stipulation, 
introduced at the hearing. The rule is no dif-
ferent than that in industrial accidents. The 
rule in the latter cases may be ·found in :Sp·encer 
v. Industrial Commission et al, 81 Utah, 511, 20 
Pac. (2nd) 618. The effect of failure to ap-ply 
this rule is illustrated by this Roberts case. 
Counsel for Roberts objects to the decision 
upon the ground th·at there is no proof that 
Roberts is such an employer-and as a matter 
of fact there is no such proof. It has been as-
sumed from other records. If properly before 
us, we could p~ass upon the weight of the evi-
dence in determining that que.stion. '' 
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We should ·appreciate, and we are ,sure the Indus-
trial Commission would app-re,ciate, an answer to these 
questions: 
1. Are the District Courts of thif? State 
now without jurisdiction of a controversy be-
tween the Industrial Commission and one claim-
ing not to be an employer~ 
2. Is an order of the Industrial Commission 
requiring payment of contributions unqualifiedly 
invalid~ · 
3. That is to say, as we view it, does the 
Industrial ·Commission have exclusive jurisdic-
tion even of judicial questions, in the initial 
stages~ 
IV. IS THE LAW C·ON~STITUTIONAL~ 
Plaintiffs question the constitutionality of Chap-
ter 43, Session Laws of 1g.37, particularly S,ection 19 
thereof, in that said purported amendatory act is in 
conflict with Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution 
of the State of Utah, which is as follows: 
''Except general appropriation bills and bills 
for the codification and general revision of 
Laws, no bill shall be passed containing more 
than one subject which shall be clearly expressed 
in its: title."' 
This Court has passed upon the following cases 
under the Unemployment Compensation Law: Globe 
Grain & Milling Company v. InduS'trial Commission, 
No. 6050, ~1 Pac. 2nd, 512. Rehearing denied, 97 Pac., 
2nd, 582; Creameries of America, Inc., v. Industrial 
Commission et al, No. 6093, 102 Pac., 2nd, 300; Salt 
Lake Tribune Publishing ,Company v. Industrial Com-
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mission et al, No. 6114, 102 ~Pac., 2nd, 307; National 
Tunnel & Mines Company v. Industrial Commission 
et ·al, No. 6119, 102 Pac., 2nd, 508; Logan Cash Knitting 
Mills v. Industrial Commission et al, No. 6130, 102 Pac., 
2nd, 495 ; Fulle-r Brush Company v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 104 Pac., 2nd, 201. 
In the Globe Grain & Milling Company case it was 
held that the Act did not restrict the benefits thereof 
to those coming strictly within the common law con-
cepts of servants or employees. This ruling is bot-
tomed upon construction of Section 19 (J) (5) as employ-
ment is there defined in Chapter 43, Laws of 1937. 
The rule has been followed in the subsequent cases. 
No case has been decided by this Court involving any 
definition other than the one in said Section 19. No 
case has been decided by this Court jn regard to the 
relationship existing between lessor and lessee under 
the contract here involved based upon common law con-
cepts of servants or employees or based upon the defin-
ition in Section 19, Chapter 1, Laws of Utah, 1936, 
Special Session. 
The title of the Act, said Chapter 43, in full is as 
follows: 
''Unemployment Compensation 
An Act Repealing Section 22 of Chapter 
1, Laws of Utah, 1936, Special Session, Re-
lating to Approp;riations and Additional Sal-
aries to Members of the Commission and 
Amending Sections 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 
and 19, Chapter 1, Laws of Utah, 1936, Special 
Session, Relating to Unemployment Compensa-
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tion; Benefits; How Claims Shall be Made and 
Determined; Rate and Pay of Contributions; 
Establishment and Control of Unemployment 
and Special Funds; the Administration of the 
Act; Reciprocal Benefit Arrangements, Payment 
of Members of Advisory Councils ; Making an 
Appropriation; Defining Terms.'' 
The object of the constitutional provision (Sec-
tion 23, Article VI) is stated by Judge Cooley in a 
passage often quoted by the Courts to be : 
''First to p·reven t hodge-podge or 'logroll-
ing' legislation ; second, to prevent surprise or 
fraud upon the legislature by means of provi-
sions in bills of which the titles gave no intima-
tion, and which might therefore be overlooked 
and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and, 
third, to fairly apprise the p·eople, through such 
publication of legislative proceedings as is usu-
ally made, of the subjects of legislation that are 
being considered, in order that they may have the 
opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition 
or otherwise, if they shall so desire.'' 1 Cooley's 
'Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Chap. VI, 
p. 296. 
In discussing the mischief intended to be remedied 
by this prov.ision, it is said in 1 Lewis' Sutherland 
Statutory Construction, 2d ed., 184, No. 111: 
''The failure to indicate in the title of the 
bill the object intended to be accomplished by 
the legislation often resulted in members voting 
ignorantly for measures which they would not 
knowingly have approved. And not only were 
legislators thus misled, but the public also; so 
that legislative provisions were stealthily pushed 
through in the closing hours of a session, which, 
having no merit to commend them, would have 
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been made odius by popular discussion and re-
monstrance if their pendency had been season-
ably announced. The constitutional cl·ause under 
discussion is intended to correct these evils; to 
prevent such corrupting aggregations of incon-
gruous measures by confining each act to one 
subject or object; to prevent surprise and inad-
vertence by requiring that subject or object to 
be expressed in the title.'' 
The rule is well stated by Mr. JuS'tice Sutherland 
In Utah Power & Light Company v. Pfost. 286 U.S. 
165; 76 L. Ed. 1038. 
The Court passed on the question in Globe Grain & 
Milling Company, cit sup. But in view that the deci-
sion was by a divided court, and that, .as stated in the 
decision, no authority on the question had been pre-
sented to the Court, it would seem to be not amiss to 
ask for a re-examination. The Court said: 
'' ( 6, 7) Petitioner contends that a holding 
as above makes the act unconstitutional as con-
travening fundamental law as contained in Ar-
ticle I, Section 7 (due process clause), Article 
I, Section 18 (against impairing the obligations 
of contract), Article VI, Section 23 (prohibiting 
a bill from containing more than one subject) 
of our State Constitution and A·rticle I, Section 
X (imp,airing obligations of contract) and the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitu-
tion, U .. S.C.A. This formidable array of asser-
tions of constitutionality is not sup·ported by 
the citation of any authorities. If the contention 
that the act did not clearly express in its title 
the subject is good, the act is unconstitutional 
regardless of whether we affirm or reverse the 
commission's findings. But the title does not 
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offend in that regard. The subject in regard 
to which the legislation pertains has been 'clearly 
expressed in the title'. The subject is 'U nem-
ployment Compensation'. The constitutional 
provision does not require that all the methods 
prescribed in the act for carrying out its objects 
be reflected in the title, nor all the classes af-
fected by the act. There may be compensation 
for some types of unemployed independent con-
tractors, as known in the common law concept, 
provided for in the act, which would be covered 
by the subject 'Unemployment Compensation'." 
91 Pac., 2nd, 516. 
A case involving the same principle as in the case 
at bar is Pet·roleum Lease Properties Company v. Huse, 
80· Pac., 2nd, 77 4, decided June 22, 1938, by the Supreme 
Court of Washington : 
Section 19 of Article 2 of the Washington Consti-
tution is as follows: 
''No bill shall embrace more than one sub-
ject and ·that shall be expressed in the title." 
At the ~937 session the legislature by its enact-
ment amended the laws of 1923 defining the word '' se-
curity'' and in such enactment ·enlarged the definition 
to include ''oil or gas leases, or any assignment, partial 
assignment, agreement to assignment, or other ins·tru-
ments in connection therewith''. Headnotes Nos. 4 and 
5 are as follows : 
''4. Statutes-109 
The constitutional requirement that act em-
brace but one subject expressed in title cannot 
be met by amendment of definition in body of 
act so as to give words· describing subject thereof 
a meaning not attaching to them in common 
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understanding without disclosing such special 
meaning in title of act. Con st. art. 2, par. 19. 
''5. Statutes-114 (7) 
The act amending definition of word 'se-
curity' in body of Securities Act to include oil 
or gas leases is unconstitutional as embodying 
regulation of matter not within m~aning of word 
'security' as commonly understood and defined 
by original act without notice of such intent in 
title. Laws 1937, p. 711, amending Laws 1923, 
p. 207; par. 1, amending Laws 1923, p·. 207, par. 
2; Const. art. 2, par. 19. '' 
At page 77·6, the Court says : 
"In Callahan v. Martin, 3 Cal, 2d 110, 43 
P. 2d 788, 794, 101 A.L.R. 871, the supreme 
court of California, in discussing the natu·re of 
these leases, says; 'Under the usual oil and gas 
lease, the owner-lessor transfers to his lessee his 
right to drill for and produce oil and other sub-
stances. The rights of the lessee present a clear 
case of a profit a prendre in gross, a right to 
remove a part of the substance of the land. If 
the oil and gas lessee is not granted exclusiv-e 
possession of the surface by the terms of the 
lease, he has nevertheless a right to such pos-
session as is necessary and convenient for the 
exercise of the p-rofit, which, in fact, may pre-
clude any other surface possession. This profit 
a prendre vests in the lessee ali incorporeal here-
ditament, a present estate, an interest in the 
land, which is a chattel real if it is to endure for 
years.' " 
And on page 777, the Court says: 
''Now no one, whether of ordinary or su-
perior intelligence, could discover from the title 
of the amendatory act that it was intended to 
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bring oil or gas leases within the operation of 
the secu-rities act by defining them- to be secur-
ities." 
and we submit that no one examining the title of the 
amendatory act herein quoted, namely, said Chapter 
43, could guess that the effect of such amendment would 
be not only to extend the benefits of unemployment com-
pensation to a large class not theretofore included in 
the Act, but that liability for contributions would attach 
as against a large class not prop·erly includable in 
the term "employer" but whose liability whould be 
created under the new definition, based upon contrac-
tual relationships which hitherto had never been con-
sidered as constituting the relationship of employer and 
employee. 
Judicial definitions extant in this State at the time 
the Unemployment Compensation statute was enacted 
distinguished between contracts of employment and 
those of independent contractors: 
Employer-Employee 
Murray v. Wasatch Grading Co., 73 Utah, 430, 
274 Pac., 940 (1929); Franksen v. Ind. 
Com., 61 Utah, 354, 213 Pac., 197 (1923),; 
Weber County-Ogden City Relief Com-
mittee v. Ind. Com., 71 Pac. (2nd) 177. 
(Utah 1937) Utah Fire Clay Co. v. Ind. 
Com., 40 Pac. (2nd) 183. (Utah 1935). 
Independent Contractors: 
Angel v. Ind. Com., 64 Utah, 105, 228 Pac. 
509 (1924); Bingham City Corp. v. Ind. 
Com,. 66 Utah, 390, 243 Pac., 113; Cal-
lahan v. Salt L~ake City, 41 Utah, 300, 125 
Pac., 863. ( 1912) ; Dayton v. Free, 46 
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Utah 277, 148 Pac., 408 (1914); Requa v. 
Daly-Judge M. Co., 148 Pac., 448 (Utah 
1915) ; S·tricker v. Ind. Com., 188 Pac., 
849 (Utah 1920); Ludlow v. Ind. Com., 235 
Pac., 884 (Utah 1925); Gozoff v. Ind. 
Com., 296 Pac., 29 (Utah 1931). 
Certainly the legislature had these definitions in 
mind in enacting our Unemployment Compensation law; 
moreover, as we have pointed out, a bona fide lease 
conferring upon the lessee an estate and dominion over 
the property, should be in a higher bracket than an 
independent contract. We think a lessee should at 
least be classed as one of the most independent of 
independent contractors. 
Chapter 43, 1937, became effective March 18, 1937 ; 
lessees registered as employers with the Conimission 
about January, 1938, and paid their contributions on 
payroll; not until August, 1940, did the Commission 
change its mind about the construction of the statute, 
when it offered to return to the lessees the amount 
theretofore paid by them as contributions. If the Com-
mission itself was misled as to the hidden meaning in-
volved in this statute, certainly the public might he. 
Now the Commision is attempting to collect from 
Combined Metals Reduction Company contributions 
based on the share of net proceeds production received 
by the lessees and including wages paid by them to 
their own employees. 
Tested by the rules laid down in Fuller Brush 
Company v. Industrial Commission, cit. sup., this would 
seem not to be a service relationship at all; and if it 
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is held to be such, then it would seem that the ti tie is 
deficient and misleading, and the act clearly unconstitu-
tional. 
The lessees worked, it is true, for six months be-
fore they encountered ore; until that time they got no 
remuneration for their labor; they worked when they 
pleased, where they pleased, and how they pleased ; 
except for the requirement in the contract that they 
supervise the work and assist in performance, they 
could do the work themselves, or hire employees to do 
it. Certainly nothing can be pointed out that made the 
lessor . in any way liable to them as for wages or any 
other form of remuneration during that p·eriod. 
How "did they get their compensation thereafter~ 
Upon severance of the ore from the freehold, such ore 
became personal property, and they owned that pro-
perty, the opinion of the Appeals Referee, notwith-
standing. The mere fact that lessor and lessee agreed 
upon a plan for marketing which assured both that the 
highest market price would he paid for the· ore, sub-
ject to deduction of a more favorable treatment charge 
than would be available to the lessees, could in no way 
change this fact of ownership. (See testimony of Mr. 
Young, Tr. pp. 5-15.) So as a rna tter of fact, lessees· 
never did receive any remuneration from lessor, in the 
form of wages for services performed, or in any other 
form. Lessees paid to lessor a percentage of what was 
received for the sale of ores as royalty or rental for 
the premises so occupied by them. 
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The amount involved in payment of contributions 
under this particular lease is not large; multiply that 
by the number of leases operated during the p·eriod by 
Comoined Metals Reduction Company, and the net 
returns from such leases, and the matter assumes some 
importance. Then compute the net returns on leases 
in the whole state for that period, and the contributions 
\\'"hich under the theory of the Commission would be re-
quired, and it would seem to be a matter that justifies 
a re-examination. 
We respectfully submit that the facts in the case 
at bar are parallel with the facts in the Washington 
case and that the decided case has in it sound reasoning 
and all the authority necessary to support the conclu-
sion reached, and respectfully submit that Chapter 43, 
Laws of 1937, and particularly Section 19 thereof, 
being in conflict with our 'Constitution, should be de-
clared invalid, and that the Court should determine the 
relationship of lessor and lessee based upon common 
law concepts and the definition of employment in Sec-
tion 19, rChapter 1, S.pecial Session Laws of 1936. 
We think the decision of the Industrial Commission 
to be wrong, and therefore request that it be annulled; 
in any event we submit our views in the hope they may 
aid in clearing up a badly confused situation, which, 
until it clears, is inimical to the interests of the State 
and all its inhabitants. 
Respectfully submitted, 
H. VAN DAM, Jr . 
.Attorney for p:laintiffs. 
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